We present a thorough empirical analysis of market impact on the Bitcoin/USD exchange market using a complete dataset that allows us to reconstruct more than one million metaorders. We empirically confirm the "square-root law" for market impact, which holds on four decades in spite of the quasi-absence of statistical arbitrage and market marking strategies. We show that the square-root impact holds during the whole trajectory of a metaorder and not only for the final execution price. We also attempt to decompose the order flow into an "informed" and "uninformed" component, the latter leading to an almost complete long-term decay of impact. This study sheds light on the hypotheses and predictions of several market impact models recently proposed in the literature. Our empirical results strongly supports the statistical latent order book model as the most relevant candidate to explain price impact on the Bitcoin market -and therefore probably on other markets as well.
Introduction
The understanding of what is called market impact is arguably one of the most exciting issues of modern financial markets, with crucial implications for regulators and financial institutions. In this article, we devote ourselves to testing on the Bitcoin market one of the most ubiquitous empirical laws observed in financial markets: the square root impact law which states that a metaorder with volume Q changes the price on average according to
where δ is typically found to be approximately 1/2, Y is an a-dimensional constant of order unity and positive (respectively negative) signs correspond to buy (respectively sell) orders. Daily volatility σ and average daily traded volume V D are used for normalization across financial instruments. Above empirical formula quantifies how market prices are affected by trades, in such a way that make them possibly depart from any "fundamental price". This may lead to unexpected price swings [17] and otherwise inexplicable stock crashes [16] as well as to well-known phenomena such as stock pinning [4] . Even more importantly, market impact directly translates into the costs incurred by financial institution when they trade. The control of these execution costs, i.e. market impact, is therefore of great practical interest and it is this link between execution costs and market impact which has stirred a huge interest in the domain. Almgren & Chriss in 2001 [2] , for example, determined optimal execution strategies based on the assumption that impact is linear (i.e. that δ = 1), which is the simplest theoretical setting that excludes round-trip execution strategies (zero terminal inventory) with negative execution costs (profit making). However, recent empirical studies (among which [3, 6, 15, 18, 20, 22] ) have clearly shown impact to be non-linear which, by using naive (and wrong) arguments, seems at first signt to contradict non-arbitrage.
Today's most widespread theoretical approaches solve this conundrum by taking into account the non-Markovian nature of impact which then leads to a concave impact laws. These approaches can be broadly split into three categories:
• First, concave market impact of metaorders can be reproduced by propagator models, in which each trade is assumed to have a transient impact which decreases according to some timedependent kernel. Summing up the impacts of individual trades leads to the impact function of the metaorder which is then found to be concave. The possible absence of dynamical arbitrage in these settings [14] allows one to solve convex optimization problems for optimal execution and find optimal liquidation strategies [1] within this framework. While these models yield fairly realistic results and are analytically tractable, they are however purely phenomenological and do not provide a mechanism to explain impact.
• Second, the class of equilibrium models tries to explain impact by using two constraints to fix the bid and the ask during the metaorder execution, usually using the martingale condition and a subtle fair pricing (similar to a non-arbitrage) argument [10, 12] , which states that the transient impact of a metaorder anticipates its permanent impact on the price so that neither the informed trader nor the market maker should make profits (on average). This argument, together with strong correlations in the order flow finally leads to an -asymptoticallyconcave metaorder impact.
• The third class of models, initiated in a different context in [5] , are statistical models of order flow [11, 18, 19, 22] and predict that the latent liquidity around the market price generically increases linearly with distance, in turn leading to an exact and universal square-root impact at all scales.
The peak impact of metaorders, i.e. the impact measured between the extremal points of the execution path, contains only partial information. It is a consensus now that impact is to a large part transient: after execution the price falls from its peak to some intermediate level, that some studies [6, 15, 20] argue to be close to 2/3 of the peak impact, in agreement with equilibrium models [12] . In [8] the authors find that this high permanent level may be due to the correlation between the trader's execution decision and the residual order flow: By taking into account this correlation they argue that the "bare" permanent impact (or mechanical permanent impact) is much lower and possibly even zero. Hitherto, these results are not well accounted for nor understood.
In the present paper we present an analysis of market impact on the Bitcoin/USD exchange market, by using a dataset of unprecedented quality. From a scientific point of view, the Bitcoin market allows for studying an extremely well controlled prototypical financial market: well controlled, as the Bitcoin exchange market is liquid and represents a single-asset economy, only very little depending on other financial products (e.g. derivative products); prototypical, as the prohibitive fees 1 inhibit high frequency market making and statistical arbitrage, thus leaving price formation to more fundamental forces.
Amongst the empirical studies of market impact in the past literature, the vast majority has relied on partial datasets. Usually, market participants have only access to their own proprietary data ( [6, 8, 22] ) which leads to an unavoidable conditioning to their trading strategies (even though in some cases many different strategies are collated together so part of the conditioning may average out). Two notable exceptions do however exist: In [20] hidden metaorders are directly inferred from brokerage codes, while Zarinelli et al. [23] have unprecedented access to the start times, end times and volumes of a huge amount of metaorders stemming from Ancerno's clients 2 .
Our dataset allows on the contrary to identify each trade with a unique trader, thereby leading to a complete picture of the market. Our dataset is large enough to study market impact as a function of volume, participation rate and even as a function of the behaviour of the residual market. This allows us to retrieve pseudo-random metaorders, i.e. metaorders that are uncorrelated from the residual order flow, either because they do not convey any information or because the information that triggered them is not shared by the residual market. After a presentation of the dataset (Sec. 2), the main definitions and methodology (Sec. 3), we discuss the price impact of metaorders on the Bitcoin exchange market in Sec. 4. The first major result of our study is that, despite its prototypical micro-structure, the square root law holds on the Bitcoin. Moreover, in Sec. 5 we show that not only the peak impact of metaorders, but rather the whole impact trajectory follows a square-root. We show unprecedented pictures of the mid-price, bid and ask trajectories during and after impact and discuss permanent and transient market impact as a function of the execution speed and its dependence on the residual order flow. We are in the position to confirm the analysis by Brokmann et al. [8] : pseudo-random metaorders have very little permanent impact. In Sec. 6 we summarize our main findings and in the last section we conclude and discuss the implications of our empirical findings for the most common impact models so far proposed in the literature.
2 Bitcoin market at a glance and data
Bitcoin : a prototypical market
The Bitcoin market started in 2008 and literally exploded in 2013 with a peak market capitalization above 10B, a daily number of transactions over 100k and a daily traded volume above 100M at the end of 2013. Bitcoin market microstructure is quite unique for several reasons. First, because of the very high level of fees (compared to other markets) of 0.6% per transaction, resulting in an average spread of ≈ 0.6%. This, to a large extent, hobbles high frequency arbitrage/market making strategies on such a market. Second, all relevant information is concentrated on one asset and one exchange (MtGox), with very little notion of a "fundamental price". This is a very unique example of a single-asset economy, with little correlations with any other asset on the planet (for the time being).
Data
This study was realized using a database of all 13M trades trades that happened on MtGox Bitcoin-USD exchange between August 2011 and November 2013, in which traders are uniquely identified 3 . Thus, we have a complete description of the market as a whole, in contrast to most hedge funds' proprietary data (reflecting their trading decision) which does not allow for a global analysis of trading decisions and market impact. As a consequence, we do not face the problem of the potentially strong conditioning of impact paths on the particular strategy of the agent. We rather have an overall insight on how agent's decisions entangle. Since there is very little brokerage intermediation in this market, we have direct knowledge of the actual initiators of each trade (only as an anonymized numerical ID code). One can thus assume that with very good approximation all metaorders can be fully identified. This is a most valuable property for studying impact, since it allows for the explanatory variable -the metaorder -to be fully characterized. This data quality is probably very difficult to obtain on other financial markets, because of brokerage intermediation, multiplicity of venues, and multiplicity of correlated instruments on which a trade can be executed. In addition, our dataset is the largest so far with such precision, and with full knowledge of the trajectories for the 1M identified metaorders.
3 Definitions and preliminary results on metaorders
Definitions
When a trader (she) wishes to bring an excess of supply or demand Q on the market, she is confronted to the question of how to achieve it in a reasonable way. If the volume she wants to sell or buy is small, then she will probably do it all at once if enough liquidity is available on the order book. However, if she wants to invest or sell back a quantity that exceeds the available offer or demand (think of large speculators or professional service providers), an instantaneous execution might destabilize the market and incur her larger costs than planned: she therefore has to split her large order into chunks, so that the imbalance can be slowly digested by the market [7] . We refer to this total quantity Q as a metaorder, denoting T its duration and µ := Q/T its execution speed, and study the quantities • I path (r, Q, µ), defined as the impact on the price of the first r% of a metaorder of size Q and execution speed µ. By definition r ∈ [0, 1] is the part of the volume already executed, and I path (0, Q, µ) = 0 is the initial price (gauged to zero);
• I(Q, µ) := I path (1, Q, µ) is the price at the end of the metaorder, referred to as the peak impact of the metaorder;
• I exec (Q, µ) := 1 0 I path (r, Q, µ)dr is the average execution price; • I ∞ (Q, µ) is the average price long after the end of the metaorder and can be decomposed into a predictable part I ∞ info (Q, µ) and the response to the metaorder in question I ∞ mec (Q, µ). The latter is the most relevant quantity regarding price formation, since the former represents alpha biases that has a priori no link with the market's mechanical reaction to the order.
Note that all these quantities are implicitly averaged over all residual noise or variables. The effect of such metaorders on the price is qualitatively well-known. While the metaorder is executed, the pressure exerted on the price tends to make it rise so I path (r, Q, µ) is an increasing function of r. When the metaorder is completed the price reverts to the permanent level I ∞ (Q, µ) ≤ I(Q, µ). Previous empirical studies have found the peak impact to be approximately square root of the volume and the amplitude of the post-impact decay to be 1/3 on average (so that I ∞ (Q, µ) ≈ I exec (Q, µ) ≈ 2 3 I(Q, µ) for square root impact, as required by equilibrium models [10, 12] ). More recent studies ( [8] , [15] ) have shown that when subtracting the predictable part I ∞ info from the price, the reversion goes all the way back to zero -so after waiting a long enough time the mechanical impact I ∞ mec (Q, µ) of trades on the price is zero. One can also define the execution rate µ V , defined as the ratio between the volume of the metaorder Q and the total volume traded by the market during the same period, V M ,
We will thus study the peak impact I(Q, µ), the average executed price I exec (Q, µ) and the permanent impact I ∞ (Q, µ), in order to identify any dependence on T (or equivalently µ) that goes beyond the usual rule of thumb (1) which predicts impact to be independent of the execution speed. Throughout this study, price is taken to be the traded price. Since we only consider aggressive metaorders (cf. Sec. 3.2), this amounts to studying the ask for buy metaorders and the bid for sell metaorders.
Metaorder decomposition and properties
The first operation needed in order to study market impact is to spot the metaorders: due to the extreme irregularity and heterogeneity between the traders' typical position paths, usual time series decomposition methods [21] are not relevant here. In order to identify these large buy and sell metaorders for this particular data, in such a way that no conditioning in the start/end sequences of the metaorders is introduced (most intuitive techniques may create mean-reversion biases), we used the following: For each trader, we defined the start of a metaorder to coincide with the first aggressive 4 order placed after a given period of inactivity 5 . We define the end point of the metaorder either as the last order before a (new) inactivity period, or as the point where the trader trades in the opposite direction. While the introduction of a time scale to define inactivity periods could seem to be arbitrary, it is the case in practice that the metaorders are so clearly distinguishable that the sensitivity to this time scale is minimal ( Fig. 1 ): for one particular trader, metaorders are very clearly separated from each other. This way, from over 14 million trades we recover over 1 4 We only consider aggressive orders since they are a much better proxy for system perturbations. Limit orders in the contrary may have been posted long in advance without a specific intention nor view on the price: By ignoring them we therefore limit any adverse selection that might bias our study. Besides, the fact that trajectories are close to TWAP strongly suggests that we do not bias the results by making this choice. 5 The relevant scale for this inactivity period has been empirically determined to be about one hour. million metaorders of variable sizes/durations 6 . Fig. 2 shows the autocorrelation function of metaorder signs which is slowly decaying with a power-law exponent around 0.4 as well as the number of metaorders that are simultaneously active in the market, which present clear clustering with a typical value around 5. The salient statistical characteristics of metaorders are presented in Fig. 3 . It presents the metaorder sizes and durations distributions, which are crucial ingredients in many market impact and price models [10, 12, 13] . Contrary to what is usually required in such models, none of these distributions are power-lawsand particularly not on all time scales. This challenges such impact models, since in these models the impact function is closely related to metaorders distributions -and a power-law with exponent 3/2 is required to reproduce the square-root impact. This is a strong hint that the distribution of order sizes is not a fundamental input to explain the shape of market impact, since it is neither clearly a power-law nor universal. Most importantly, above figure shows that the average execution profile follows standard TWAPs profiles 7 . This property ensures that µ is well defined in the sense that it is on average constant during execution. This will allow us to properly compare points 6 as emphasized above, this makes our dataset the largest studied so far, if one excepts [23] but importantly they had no access to the full execution trajectories.
7 Time Weighted Average Price, which consists in executing at constant speed within impact trajectories, I path (r, Q, µ), with peak impacts I(rQ, µ).
Conditioning checks
It has been shown in the previous section that average execution style is close to TWAP, so that we can really study the effect on the price of metaorders with constant execution speed on average 8 In this section, we proceed to some other checks concerning the behaviour of the rest of the market while metaorders are being executed. Indeed, the usual argument against the square-root law assumes them to be conditioned to the rest of the market in such a way, that the apparent concavity of the marginal impact is only an artifact. In particular, anticipating Sec. 5, we look into the buy/sell market order flow while a metaorder is executed, to check whether dynamical effects exist in order flow that could result in concavity: for example, a higher correlation with market imbalance at the beginning of the metaorder would result in sharper price changes at the start of the trajectories 9 . The empirical data (Fig. 4) shows that such a synchronisation of metaorders is almost non-existent, either in terms of number of metaorders or in terms of volume, so that concavity of impact is not generated by some kind of synchronization between the agents 10 . Since the study of impact paths in Sec. 5 will show that the square-root law holds for the whole trajectories and not only for the peak impact, one can assert that concavity is true in the sense that it does not stem from conditioning but is really the way the market absorbs an excess of supply or demand.
8 as opposed e.g. to [23] in which they find strongly front-loaded executions. 9 This would imply some sort of synchronization between the agents, either exogenous (e.g. the agents react to the same news thus starting their metaorders at the same time, but some stopping before the others) or endogenous (e.g. arbitrageurs are able to detect metaorders and push the price up at its beginning to sell back later when the price has risen).
10 One can note the interesting (unrelated) fact that market order volume in the opposite direction slightly decreases while a metaorder is being executed. 4 The square root impact law for the Bitcoin/USD exchange market
The square root law of peak impact for individual metaorders
For each of the 1M metaorders we identified above, we considered the impact defined as
i.e. the difference between the first and the last executed price, quantifying the reaction of the market to the trader's order. Note that here impact is measured as the peak price (with the initial price gauged to zero). The result is shown in Fig. 5 : In spite of the very special features of the Bitcoin market, a concave impact law (depicted as a straight line)
fits the data points very well from the smallest scales and over 4 decades with δ ≈ 0.5 and Y ≈ 4.5 · 10 −2 . Normalizing by Bitcoin average volatility and daily volume gives a Y-ratio (as defined in Eq. 1) of Y ≈ 0.9, close to the value reported on "mature" financial markets (futures or stocks, see e.g. [8, 22] ). For a more in-depth study of the Y-ratio, see Sec. 4.3 below. Thus, peak impact for the Buy meta-orders Sell meta-orders δ = 0.5 Figure 5 : Market impact I(Q, µ) µ (averaged over all execution rates µ), follows the same square root law as is observed by banks and hedge funds on financial markets (plots in log-log scale). The impact exponent δ is found to be very close to 0.5, and the Y -ratio is around 0.9. One should emphasize that this power-law behaviour appears at the smallest scales and holds over 4 decades.
(left) Only end points of metaorders (∼1M data). (right) 41 point per metaorder (every 2.5% quantile of volume), giving 27M data points. Part of these points being degenerate, one can assess the number of effective points around a few millions.
Bitcoin is consistent with the square-root law despite the prototypical nature of the Bitcoin market. This confirms the view expressed in [18, 22] that market impact depends neither on microstructure (with e.g. arbitrage and high-frequency trading), nor on a clear metaorder distribution. As such, it directly challenges the explanation of concave market impact in terms of rational equilibrium theories.
Square root impact trajectories
We now turn to the study of impact trajectories, i.e. the quantity I path (r, Q, µ) for given Q, µ and r varying from 0 to 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, we average over all other quantities in the following (like e.g. daily volatility, daily traded volume etc.). Fig. 6 shows the results, putting into light two facts of particular interest. The first is the answer to question whether the impact trajectories follows the same law as peak impacts. On the Bitcoin, where execution paths are nicely close to TWAPs, the agreement is remarkable, meaning that while the metaorder is not finished the market makes no difference between a metaorder that will stop soon and a metaorder that will continue 11 . We find empirically that I path (r, Q, µ) = I(rQ, µ) .
Hence, if t is the time elapsed since the start of the execution, one can write impact as
where δ ≈ 1/2. The first value has intentionally been chosen high, so that it survives the criticism raised in Section 5.2 that on average other metaorders in the same direction are observed, which tends to artificially increase impact measures. One can observe a liquidity breakdown leading to an asymptotically linear impact when important pressures are maintained for too long on the same side of the order book.
Second, one may observe that when not enough data points are used the value of the Y -factor appears to be noisy, so that impact lines do not superimpose (but are all parallel). This suggests that before averaging (as opposed to the average impact that we considered until now I) impact can be written as
where η(µ) and W t are stochastic -but η is constant during the whole trajectory. In terms of reaction-diffusion [11] , the η component would mean that the slopes of the order book vary so that Y varies 12 , whereas the W t component can be naturally identified to the drift term that represents random price moves. The variable factorization presented in this section is one of the main results of this paper, and is quite reminiscent of the theoretical conclusions of reaction-diffusion models [11, 19] . In particular, we are in the position to claim that the square root does not stem from a particular conditioning of the order size on the state of the order book at the very moment when the metaorders is sent. Rather, the square-root law is a trajectory-wise effect. This has one major implication: Any market impact model must reproduce the square root law trajectory-wise and at the smallest scales -and not only predict the right average or peak price. Besides this behaviour must be a direct result from an excess of supply/demand and not rely e.g. on conditioning to the rest of the market. One can estimate empirically the ratio Var(η)/σ 2 if one assumes that W t is a Wiener process by noticing that in this case
Numerical values for Var(η)/σ 2 are found to be within the range [0, 2] which suggests that about half the variance of peak impact measures comes from Y -factor fluctuations, which leads us to the next section. Of interest is also the liquidity breakdown that appears when important pressures are maintained for too long on the same side of the order book, leading to an asymptotically linear impact (which is highly reminiscent of what happened during May 6 2010 flash crash [9] ).
The "Y-ratio"
Until now, much emphasis has been put in the literature on the study of the dependence in Q but very few studies have been realized on the pre-factor Y -or equivalently the Y-ratio defined in Eq. 1. We devote this section to a temporal analysis of both these pre-factors. For each meta-order i, we compute its individual Y i as the ratio I(Q i )/ | Q i | × sign(Q i ). For each day, we compute the daily average Y as a volume-weighted average of all individual ratios. In parallel, we compute the daily realized volatility σ D and traded volume V D , and we compare the daily Y 's to the corresponding σ D / √ V D ratios for every day in our dataset. For each day, we also plot the actual Y-ratio. Results are presented on Fig. 7 and show that after such rescaling, the Y-ratio becomes nearly time independent. Its distribution is plotted on Fig. 8 From these results, we can draw two conclusions of particular interest. First, it validates the scaling form of Eq. 1 proposed in [22] . Indeed, the non-stationariness of the impact pre-factor Y is well encoded in the ratio σ D √ V D . Besides, the residual a-dimensional Y-ratio is shown to be of order unity with a standard deviation of the same order of magnitude so that it essentially lies in the interval [0, 2] . In this light, Eqs. 1 and 7 can be merged together so that impact reads
The relationship between the liquidity noise σ Y and the market noise σ 13 -and their dynamicshave not been investigated here, although it is a topic of interest for further studies. The other conclusion is more macroscopic and relates to the study of market stability. Indeed, the scaling form for Y holds particularly well during extreme market events, such as the major crash that occurred on April 10, 2013. This definitely relates the microscopic aspect of price formation -i.e. the impact of individual trades -to its macroscopic characteristics such as its (in-)stability that manifests itself through crashes (see [16] for similar discussions on financial markets). In this light, the understanding of how trades impact prices appears more crucial than ever to understand -and perhaps even control? -market instabilities. Avg Exec Ask Bid Figure 9 : Impact paths for different volumes. In black, the actual execution path. In red, the ask path, and in light blue, the bid path. In green, we also plot the average execution price of the market -which lies around the mid-price. One can see that even for large volumes, impact is at most 1 or 2 spreads, not mentioning the fees that are of same order of magnitude than the spread: impact costs are dominated by friction costs, challenging martingale and fair pricing conditions.
The large fees on Bitcoin allow for a separate study of the bid and the ask during the execution and prevents the data to be too noisy due to high-frequency arbitrage. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that metaorders are buy orders, so that the ask denotes the opposite side of the order book, on which the trader executes his/her metaorder. The facts of interest are the following :
• Before the execution, the spread is roughly constant, and the execution direction is on average positively correlated with both the bid and the ask evolution before the execution (Fig. 9 ).
• During the execution, the ask rises sharply -following the same square root as the execution price -whereas the bid follows more linearly. This is very reminiscent of what is found theoretically in [11] .
• After this quick reversion, the bid and the ask remain roughly constant at a non-zero permanent level, in spite of the order flow pressure from the rest of the market that continues some time after the metaorder.
• These observations hold when we condition the metaorder to be trend-following or meanreverting, as shown on Fig. 10 . In particular, the fact that impact is still square root at small scales for trend-following metaorders is non-trivial and reveals that trading speed matters 14 .
• In any case, impact does not exceed very much the order of magnitude of the spread and the fees, which questions any interpretation based on "fair-price" arguments, all the more so that impact is square root even at the smallest scales. 
Impact and execution speed
The question of dependence of impact on the execution speed µ has been addressed very recently by [23] even though practitioners have been looking into it for at least a few years (CFM unpublished).
In this section we study the impact surface described by the bivariate function I exec (Q, µ V ) 15 For each fixed µ V the dependence on Q is found to be square root:
However, the dependence on µ is somewhat surprising. First, for very high participation rates (close to 100% of the volume during the period), the impact becomes unusually high. This is not surprising since the market breaks down in this regime 16 . More importantly however, while one could expect that impact monotonically decreases as the execution rate decreases, the observed impact actually increases again (cf. Fig. 11 ), at variance with intuition and previous findings on financial markets ([23] etc). The best fit to the empirical data reads I exec (Q, µ V ) ∼ Q δ /µ δ V , with δ ≈ 0.5 and δ ≈ 0.4 (cf. Fig. 11 ). The slower the execution, the larger the measured impact: this strange dependence on µ V stresses the difference between mechanical and informational impact. Clearly, a slow execution gives other market participants the opportunity to detect the same signal and the information content of the metaorder realizes during its execution. On the other hand, fast execution leads mostly to mechanical impact as the alpha realizes itself afterwards. Following this first non-intuitive discovery -which is very specific to the Bitcoin -, for each of the data points of Fig. 11 we plotted the whole market order imbalance sign(Q) · V signed M 17 . The similarity of both pictures (see Fig. 11 top images) is striking: during metaorders, impact is a very nice square root of global market imbalance. This leads to the following conclusion: Market impact is not a reaction to individual metaorders, but to the whole order flow. This seems rather natural since orders are anonymous, hence the aggregated order flow should be the only relevant quantity.
One question remains however: How to study the mechanical impact of one isolated metaorder? We can answer this question by searching the data for metaorders that are not correlated with the rest of the market, i.e. in the course of which the residual order flow does not trend nor antitrend: we selected all metaorders that account for more than 75% of the market net imbalance on [t 0 , t 0 + 10T ] where t 0 is the starting time of the metaorder and T is its duration, so that the rest of the market can be considered neutral during the measurements. Fig. 12 compares the impact of randomly chosen metaorders (which are positively correlated to the rest of the market), that we will refer to as "informed", and isolated metaorders (that we will refer to as "uninformed") and clearly shows that impact of isolated metaorders decreases far below the 2/3 threshold. This illustrates the fact that impact is built up by an "informational" component, that reveals itself during and after the execution and results in an apparent permanent impact (in the case of isolated orders this component is by definition zero or very small) and a "mechanical" component whose shape after execution is consistent with a decay all the way to zero. This confirms the argument presented in [11] , whose framework suggests that mechanical peak impact is found by removing the permanent part of the impact:
One might ask whether the "informed/uninformed" terminology is appropriate here, since we never wonder about external information. Actually, the fact that isolated metaorders have no perma- 15 We prefer here the average quantity I exec (Q, µ V ) to the peak impact I(Q, µ V ) since latter is much noisier. The mean execution price is anyway far more relevant in practice since it is directly related to execution costs. We also preferred the execution rate µ V to the execution speed µ as a fundamental variable since for this particular study this quantity is more relevant and yields cleaner pictures. 16 this fact is of importance since such an observation would probably be impossible on financial markets, where participation rates rarely exceed 20 − 30% -for this very reason. The impact surface (in log-log-log scale) for typical metaorders (top) which are correlated with the total order flow. During the execution span of the metaorder, the market reacts rather to total market imbalance as to the individual market order: For all participation rates market impact is almost perfectly proportional to the square root of the total order flow as defined in the main text. Bottom images: Impact of an isolated metaorder (for which the residual market order flow remains neutral). The total market imbalance corresponds to the volume of the metaorder; hence, the participation rate is not a suitable measure. Rather, the execution time should be regarded. The figure clearly displays an impact that decreases when the execution time increases as is predicted by, e.g. [11] . nent impact, and therefore no "informational content" on average, indicates that the permanent component of the impact -that one may refer to as the informational content of the metaordershould be interpreted as a correlation between the metaorder and future traders' behaviours and not as some information about any "fundamental price". Concerning the dependence of impact on the execution speed, the same kind of impact surface can be plotted after conditioning on isolated metaorders only, showing that after accounting for the bias the impact actually decreases, as expected intuitively, when the execution speed decreases:
However, the measure is too noisy to quantify precisely this dependence. Such a behaviour is strikingly reminiscent of what is obtained within the reaction-diffusion framework of [11] -and less consistent with equilibrium models which so far do not deal with the issue of execution speed.
Summary of main results
We have presented a very detailed analysis of market impact on the Bitcoin exchange market. For the sake of a clear understanding let us summarize here our main results:
1. Large orders are split into small trades which confirms the wide-spread belief that large orders have to be executed incrementally. On our MtGox dataset over 1 million metaorders are clearly identifiable, corresponding to 14M trades.
2. Metaorders size and duration distributions are not power-law. However, on Bitcoin they have the very nice property of being executed at a constant average rate (TWAPs).
as defined in Eq. 1, fluctuates around a mean-value of order unity: to be more precise, its distribution is well approximated by a Gaussian distribution of mean Y 0 = 0.9 and standard deviation Σ Y = 0.35. The full stochastic impact formula we propose is thus given by Eq. 9.
5. We have presented strong evidence that the market reacts to the total order flow and not to distinct metaorders. This implies that metaorders are not detected by other market participants, as assumed in some equilibrium models [12] . More importantly, the impacts of different metaorders are in fact dependent and do not add up linearly.
6. To subtract the effect of the order flow, and to measure the marginal effect of one isolated metaorder, we have selected metaorders that were not correlated to the market's local direction. This allowed us to show that for slow execution speeds the average execution cost I exec (Q, µ) decreases -even though measures are too noisy to make a proper fit -and that the mechanical component of the permanent impact I ∞ mec (Q, µ) is close to zero. Such a behaviour is consistent with kernel models and statistical order book models such as [11] that naturally generalize them.
7. The marginal impact of these isolated metaorders drops far below the 2/3 level predicted by equilibrium theories. The permanent impact of isolated trades is probably zero, as concluded in [8] .
Conclusion
Thanks to a remarkable dataset covering all transactions on the MtGox Bitcoin/USD exchange, we have conducted a comprehensive analysis of the market impact of over one million metaorders on Bitcoin. This prototypical market has two features of importance that motivate such a study: First, it corresponds to a single-asset economy, a quite unique example. Second, since each transaction is charged fees of 0.6% of its amount, the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs is the exception rather than the rule. The fact that the square-root law for impact holds in such conditions allows us to some general conclusions on the hypotheses of impact models. Because of the large fees, the stylized fact on Bitcoin must be explained by theories that depend neither on statistical arbitrage nor on high frequency market making. Similarly, any notions of fair pricing seem irrelevant here since it is not reasonable to think that investors behave such that they break even exactly on their impact (of order a fraction of a percent) when they pay fees that are larger than 1%. The same is true for martingale conditions: price efficiency cannot be enforced on fluctuations below 1% of the typical price, which exceed from far typical impact values. The fact that the square-root impact holds in such a precise way at all scales on Bitcoin clearly shows that sophisticated equilibrium and arbitrage mechanisms are not the underlying mechanism of market impact. On the contrary, this study incites us to think that impact is driven by a generic "fundamental" mechanism that emerges together with the simple phenomenon of supply and demand. From this point of view, we believe that statistical order-book models (such as reaction-diffusion models [11, 19, 22] ) are the best candidates to date to explain the usual shape of market impact.
